On Bankruptcy Game Theoretic Interval Rules by Branzei, Rodica et al.
On Bankruptcy Game Theoretic Interval Rules
Rodica Branzei
University “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Ias¸i, Romania
branzeir@info.uaic.ro
Marco Dall’Aglio
Luiss University, Rome, Italy
mdallaglio@luiss.it
Stef Tijs
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
S.H.Tijs@uvt.nl
November 22, 2012
Abstract
Interval bankruptcy problems arise in situations where an estate
has to be liquidated among a fixed number of creditors and uncertainty
about the amounts of the claims is modeled by intervals. We extend in
the interval setting the classical results by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs
(1987) that characterize division rules which correspond to solutions of
the cooperative bankruptcy game. Finally, we analyze the difficulties
with incorporating the uncertainty about the estate.
Keywords: cooperative games; interval data; bankruptcy prob-
lems.
JEL Classification: C71.
1 Introduction
Bankruptcy problems provide a simple and effective mathematical model to
describe situations where an estate has to be divided among a fixed number
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of individuals (creditors or players) who advance claims with total value too
large to be fully compensated by the value of the estate. The foundations for
these models are set in the works of O’Neill [9] and Aumann and Maschler
[1]. These authors analyze the seemingly mysterious solutions for specific
instances of a bankruptcy problem prescribed in the Babylonian Talmud and
find that the answers given by the ancient book are in fact solutions of a coop-
erative game, called the bankruptcy game, played by the creditors. Curiel,
Maschler and Tijs [5] consolidate the links between bankruptcy problems
and cooperative game theory by studying the whole class of division rules
for bankruptcy problems which correspond to solutions of the corresponding
bankruptcy game. They provide a characterization of such rules by means
of a truncation property: the solution based on the bankruptcy game are
those, and only those, that ignore claims which are higher than the whole
estate, and reduce them to the value of the estate. The same work also
characterizes division rules that provide allocations belonging to the core of
the bankruptcy game. A review of the literature on bankruptcy problems is
given in Moulin [8] and Thomson [12].
The bankruptcy problem studied in those pioneering works requires an
exact knowledge of all the terms of a bankruptcy problem. We allow instead
for a certain degree of uncertainty on the problem data. In fact, claimants
often face uncertainty regarding their effective rights and, as a result, indi-
vidual claims can be expressed in the form of closed intervals without any
probability distributions attached to them. In such situations our model
based on interval claims fits better than the more standard claims approach
and, additionally, offers flexibility in conflict resolution under interval uncer-
tainty of the estate at stake. Economic applications of our approach include
funds allocation of a firm among its divisions (Pulido, Sa`nchez-Soriano and
Llorca [11], Pulido et al. [10]), priority problems Moulin [7], distribution of
penalty costs in delayed projects (Branzei et al. [4]) and disputes related to
cooperation in joint projects where agents have restricted willingness to pay
(Tijs and Branzei [13]).
Our aim is to extend the general result by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs
regarding bankruptcy problems with classical (or exact) data to the inter-
val setting. Can we characterize interval division rules which correspond to
solutions for interval bankruptcy games? Special care is placed on the def-
initions of the entities and of the operations in the new environment. In
particular, we verify that the characterization Theorem of Curiel, Maschler
and Tijs (Theorem 5 in [5]) can be extended to the case of interval claims.
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However, we show through counterexamples that a similar extension to the
case where the interval uncertainty affects both the claims and the estate is
not so straightforward.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
definitions and the results of interest in the classical setting; Section 3 intro-
duces interval bankruptcy problems and their truncations; Section 4 provides
the extension of the characterization Theorem with interval uncertainty re-
garding the claims and uncertainty-free estate. In the last section we show
the difficulties of including interval uncertainty for the estate.
2 The classical setting
All the results in this section are taken from Curiel, Maschler and Tijs
[5]. We consider situations where a monetary estate E ∈ R+ has to be
divided among a set of claimants (players) N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, each hav-
ing a claim di, i ∈ N , over the estate. Let d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) ∈ Rn+
denote the n-tuple of claims. It is assumed that E ≤ ∑i∈N di. A di-
vision rule f associates with each bankruptcy problem (E, d) an n-tuple
f(E, d) = (f1(E, d), f2(E, d), . . . , fn(E, d)) such that
di ≥ fi(E, d) ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N
fi(E, d) = E.
A cooperative game, called the bankruptcy game, is defined by
vE,d(S) = (E −
∑
i∈N\S
di)+ ,
where (x)+ = max{0, x}. vE,d(S) denotes the minimal amount that the coali-
tion S ⊂ N will receive, once the claims of the creditors outside S have
been fully compensated. Individual claims larger than the whole estate may
be considered unreasonable. If this is the case, we consider the truncated
bankruptcy problem (E, d ∧ E), where d ∧ E = (d1 ∧ E, d2 ∧ E, . . . , dn ∧ E)
and a ∧ b = min{a, b}.
Definition 2.1. A division rule f for a bankruptcy problem is a game theo-
retic division rule if there is a solution concept g1 for cooperative games such
1In [5] the notion of solution concept is not defined explicitly. We will simply assume
that g is any mapping from R2
n−1
+ to Rn+. Any game v among n players is fully defined
by 2n − 1 values since v(∅) = 0 always holds.
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that
f(E, d) = g(vE,d) for every bankruptcy problem(E, d) ∈ BRN .
We will focus on extension of the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.2. ([5], Theorem 5) A division rule f for bankruptcy problems
is a game theoretic division rule if and only if f(E, d) = f(E, d ∧ E).
3 The interval setting
Here we extend our analysis to the situation where the claim of each player
is expressed as an interval (instead of a single value). To cope with interval
uncertainty, we denote by I(R+) the set of all closed and bounded intervals
in R+, and by I(R+)N the set of all n−dimensional vectors whose elements
belong to I(R+). Let I, J ∈ I(R+) with I = [I, I], J = [J, J ], then I + J =
[I + J, I + J ] and I − J = [I − J, I − J ]. We say that I is weakly better than
J , which we denote by I  J, or, equivalently by J  I, if I ≥ J and I ≥ J.
For further reference on interval mathematics we refer to Moore [6].
Here we deal with a “crisp” estate E and an n-tuple of interval claims
[d] = ([d1, d1], [d2, d2], . . . , [dn, dn]). We will assume that
E ≤
∑
i∈N
di. (1)
meaning that in no case the estate will be sufficiently rich to satisfy the
claimants’ requests in full.
Definition 3.1. An interval bankruptcy rule determines, for each estate E
and each set of interval claims [d] an n-tuple of interval rewards
F(E, [d]) = (F1(E, [d]),F2(E, [d]), . . . ,Fn(E, [d])) ∈ I(R)N
which are reasonable, i.e. [0, 0]  Fi(E, [d])  [di, di] for each i ∈ N , and
weakly efficient2, i.e.
∑
i∈N Fi(E, [d]) 3 E.
We will consider reasonable monotonicity assumptions for our bankrupt-
cy rules. Denote with d−i the set of all claims but the claim of the i-th player,
i.e.
d−i = {d1, . . . , di−1, di+1, . . . , dn}.
Our rule f will satisfy the following
2As opposed to (strong) efficiency, which requires
∑
i∈N Fi(E, [d]) = [E,E].
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Assumption 3.2. We will consider bankruptcy rules satisfying monotonicity
in the resources and in both self-regarding and other-regarding claims. More
in detail, for every i ∈ N , the component fi of the classical bankruptcy rule f
is nondecreasing in E and di, while it is nonincreasing in each dj, j ∈ N \{i}.
It can be shown that the most important bankruptcy rules3 verify As-
sumption 3.2 (this is illustrated in Branzei et al. [2], Appendix A)
Definition 3.3. Given a bankruptcy rule f , we define the interval bankruptcy
rule based on f as
F(f ;E, [d]) = (Fi(f ;E, [d]))i∈N
where
Fi(f ;E, [d]) = [fi(E, di, d−i), fi(E, di, d−i)] for every i ∈ N . (2)
We say that an interval is tight with respect to a given property if each
proper subset of that interval does not satisfy the same property.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose f satisfies Assumption 3.2. Then
(i) for each i ∈ N and d ∈ [d], we have
fi(E, d) ∈ Fi(f ;E, [d])
and, for all i ∈ N , the interval Fi(f ;E, [d]) is tight with respect to
selection inclusion.
(ii) F(f, ·, ·) is weakly efficient and reasonable.
Proof. To prove (i) consider the following chain of inequalities valid by As-
sumption 3.2 for each i ∈ N and d ∈ [d]:
fi(E, di, d−i) ≤ fi(E, d) ≤ fi(E, di, d−i) .
3these include: the proportional rule, defined by PROPi(E, d) =
di
DE for all i ∈ N , with
D =
∑
i∈N di; the constrained equal awards rule, defined by CEAi(E, d) = min {di, α},
where α is determined by
∑
i∈N CEAi(E, d) = E; the constrained equal losses rule, defined
by CELi(E, d) = max {di − β, 0}, where β is determined by
∑
i∈N CELi(E, d) = E; the
Talmudic rule TAL(E, d), given by CEA(E, d2 ) if E ≤ D2 and by d2 + CEL(E − D2 , d2 )
otherwise.
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Since the extremes are attained, they define the smallest interval with this
property.
To prove (ii) simply note that the classical bankruptcy rule f is reason-
able, and therefore, for each i ∈ N ,
di ≥ fi(E, di, d−i) ≥ 0 ; di ≥ fi(E, di, d−i) ≥ 0,
and efficient, so ∑
i∈N
fi(E, di, d−i) ≤
∑
i∈N
fi(E, di, d−i) = E ;∑
i∈N
fi(E, di, d−i) ≥
∑
i∈N
fi(E, di, d−i) = E .
Next, we focus on truncation properties for interval claims. Any claim
that exceeds the estate E may be considered excessive. Accordingly, we
truncate all claims with respect to this single value. Denote
[d] ∧ E = ([di ∧ E, di ∧ E])i∈N
Definition 3.5. The truncated interval bankruptcy rule based on f is given
by F(f ;E, [d] ∧ E) .
The truncated interval rule plays an important role when the underlying
classical division rule f is game theoretic.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that f is a game theoretic division rule satisfying
Assumption 3.2. Then
(i) The interval bankruptcy rule coincides with its truncated form, i.e.
F(f ;E, [d] ∧ E) = F(f ;E, [d]) ; (3)
(ii) For each i ∈ N and d∗ ∈ [d], we have
fi(E, d
∗) ∈ Fi(f ;E, [d] ∧ E)
and, for all i ∈ N , the interval Fi(f, E, [d] ∧E) is tight with respect to
selection inclusion;
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(iii) The truncated interval bankruptcy rule is weakly efficient and reason-
able.
Proof. To prove (i), note that, since f is game theoretic
F(f ;E, [d]) = ([fi(E, di, d−i), fi(E, di, d−i)])i∈N =(
[fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E), fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E)]
)
i∈N =(
[fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E), fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E)]
)
i∈N
= F(f ;E, [d] ∧ E).
To show (ii) consider the following chain of (in)equalities valid for each
i ∈ N and d∗ ∈ [d]:
fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E) = fi(E, di, d−i) ≤
fi(E, d
∗) ≤ fi(E, di, d−i) = fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E) . (4)
The inequalities in the middle derive from the claim monotonicity properties
of f , while the fact that f is a game theoretic rule and Theorem 2.2 explain
the equality signs at the extremes. Once again, the extremes are attained.
Regarding (iii), we have
di ≥ fi(E, di, d−i) = fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E) ≥ 0 ,
di ≥ fi(E, di, d−i) = fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E) ≥ 0 ,
while ∑
i∈N
fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E) =
∑
i∈N
fi(E, di, d−i) ≤ E ,∑
i∈N
fi(E, di ∧ E, d−i ∧ E) =
∑
i∈N
fi(E, di, d−i) ≥ E .
4 Interval Bankruptcy Games and Game The-
oretic Rules
We now extend the notion of bankruptcy game to the specific interval setting
by considering the interval bankruptcy game already defined in [3].
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Definition 4.1. The interval bankruptcy game for the estate E and interval
claims [d] is defined, for each S ⊂ N , by
wE,[d](S) = [vE,d(S), vE,d(S)] =E − ∑
i∈N\S
di

+
,
E − ∑
i∈N\S
di

+
 . (5)
For each S ⊂ N , the interval is delimited by what is left to coalition S
in the worst and in the best possible situation, respectively, after the players
outside S have been compensated with their full claim.
We now show that every classical bankruptcy game originating from the
estate E and claims [d] is a selection of the interval bankruptcy game, i.e. its
values fall in the range of the interval bankruptcy game, and that the each
interval game determination is tight with respect to its selections.
Proposition 4.2. For each S ⊂ N and each d∗ ∈ [d]
vE,d∗(S) ∈ wE,[d](S) for each S ⊂ N ,
and each interval wE,[d](S) is tight.
Proof. Simply note that, for each S ⊂ N and each d∗ ∈ [d],
E −
∑
i∈N\S
di ≤ E −
∑
i∈N\S
d∗i ≤ E −
∑
i∈N\S
di,
and the chain of inequalities remains valid if we apply the (·)+ operator.
Therefore
wE,[d](S) ≤ vE,d(S) ≤ wE,[d](S).
Just as in the previous section, we consider a truncated form.
Definition 4.3. The truncated interval bankruptcy game is defined, for each
S ⊂ N , as wE,[d]∧E(S).
As in the previous case, the two games coincide.
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Proposition 4.4. Every interval bankruptcy game coincides with its trun-
cated form, i.e.
wE,[d]∧E(S) = wE,[d](S) for all S ⊂ N.
Proof. It follows from the following equation, valid for any d∗ ∈ [d] and any
S ⊂ N E − ∑
i∈N\S
(d∗i ∧ E)

+
=
E − ∑
i∈N\S
d∗i

+
. (6)
To prove it, we distinguish two cases: (i) if d∗i < E for any i ∈ N \ S then
d∗i ∧E = d∗i for any i. (ii) If d∗j ≥ E for some j ∈ N \S then both quantities
in (6) reduce to 0.
We now consider those division rules which can be related with solutions
of the interval bankruptcy game defined by (5).
Definition 4.5. An interval division rule F is an interval game theoretic rule
if there exists an interval solution concept G for interval cooperative games,
i.e. a mapping from I(R+)2
n−1 to I(R+)n, such that
F(E, [d]) = G(wE,[d]).
We are now able to state a full extension of Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 4.6. An interval division rule F based on the classical bankruptcy
rule f is game theoretic if and only if the rule coincides with its truncated
form, i.e. (3) holds.
Proof. Suppose that F(f ; ·, ·) is game theoretic. Then, by Proposition 4.4,
for any estate E and claims [d],
F(f ;E, [d]) = G(wE,[d]) = G(wE,[d]∧E) = F(f ;E, [d] ∧ E)
and, therefore, (3) holds.
Conversely, let f be the classical bankruptcy rule on which the rule F is
based, and suppose that (3) holds. Consider the following interval solution
concept Gf defined for any interval game w
Gf (w) = ([fi(w(N), Kwi , Kw−i), fi(w(N), Kwi , Kw−i)])i∈N ,
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where, for each i ∈ N ,
K
w
i = M
w
i +
(
w(N)−∑i∈N Mwi )+
n
Kwi = M
w
i +
(
w(N)−∑i∈N Mwi )+
n
and, for each i ∈ N ,
M
w
i = w(N)− w(N \ {i})
Mwi = w(N)− w(N \ {i})
Now we apply the interval rule Gf to the interval bankruptcy game w[E],d
defined in (5). Clearly, w[E],d(N) = w[E],d(N) = E and, for each i ∈ N
K
w
i = M
w
i = E − (E − di)+ = di ∧ E ,
Kwi = M
w
i = E − (E − di)+ = di ∧ E ,
because (
w[E],d(N)−
∑
i∈N
M
w
i
)
+
=
(
w[E],d(N)−
∑
i∈N
Mwi
)
+
= 0 .
Thus
Gf (wE,[d]) = F(f ;E, [d] ∧ E) = F(f ;E, [d]) ,
the last equality following from (3).
The following result becomes a direct consequence of the previous Theo-
rem.
Theorem 4.7. Let f be a classical game theoretic bankruptcy rule. Then,
the interval bankruptcy rule F(f ; ·, ·) based on f is also game theoretic.
Proof. If f is game theoretic, then (3) holds by Proposition 3.6. Apply
Theorem 4.6.
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5 The trouble with the interval estate
Just as for the claims, the effective amount of the estate may be a source
of uncertainty. It is therefore natural to extend the model of bankruptcy
interval rule and bankruptcy interval game to the case where both the estate
and the claims are of the interval type, i.e. [E] ∈ I(R) and [d] ∈ I(R)N ,
respectively.
Definition 5.1. Let f be a classical bankruptcy rule. The interval bankruptcy
rule based on f for the interval estate [E] and the interval claims [d] is as
F(f ; [E], [d]) = (Fi(f ; [E], [d]))i∈N
where
Fi(f ; [E], [d]) = [fi(E, di, d−i), fi(E, di, d−i)] for every i ∈ N . (7)
We have
Proposition 5.2. Suppose f satisfies Assumption 3.2. Then
(i) for each i ∈ N , E∗ ∈ [E] and d∗ ∈ [d], we have
fi(E
∗, d∗) ∈ Fi(f ; [E], [d])
and, for all i ∈ N , the interval Fi(f ; [E], [d]) is tight.
(ii) F(f, ·, ·) is weakly efficient and reasonable.
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 3.4 and is therefore omit-
ted. We turn our attention to a suitable interval game for this situation.
Definition 5.3. The interval bankruptcy game for the interval estate [E] and
interval claims [d] is defined, for each S ⊂ N , by
w[E],[d](S) = [vE,d(S), vE,d(S)] =E − ∑
i∈N\S
di

+
,
E − ∑
i∈N\S
di

+
 . (8)
An analogue of Proposition 4.2 holds (where, again, the proof is omitted).
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Proposition 5.4. For each S ⊂ N , each E∗ ∈ [E] and each d∗ ∈ [d]
vE∗,d∗(S) ∈ w[E],[d](S) for each S ⊂ N ,
and each interval w[E],[d](S) is tight.
Having extended the notion of bankruptcy game to the interval setting for
both the estate and the claims, we may hope that an analogue of Theorem 4.7
would hold. The following counterexample, however, highlights a situation
where two instances of interval data pertaining to the same game theoretic
classical bankruptcy rule generate the same interval game with two distinct
interval rules. The interval bankruptcy rule cannot be derived as an interval
solution concept of the interval bankruptcy game.
Example 5.5. Compare the following two situations with two claimants.
Situation a [E,E]a = [6, 8], [d1, d1]a = [6, 7] and [d2, d2]a = [2, 3]
Situation b [E,E]b = [6, 8], [d1, d1]b = [6, 7.5] and [d2, d2]b = [2, 3]
If we consider f to be the game theoretic Talmudic (TAL) rule4, it is easy
to verify that
F(TAL; [E]a, [d]a) = ([4.5, 6.5], [1, 2.5]) 6=
([4.5, 6.75], [1, 2.5]) = F(TAL; [E]b, [d]b). (9)
On the other hand, the two interval games w[E]a,[d]a and w[E]b,[d]b coincide,
since
w[E]a,[d]a({1}) = w[E]b,[d]b({1}) = [3, 6] ;
w[E]a,[d]a({2}) = w[E]b,[d]b({2}) = [0, 2] ;
w[E]a,[d]a({1, 2}) = w[E]b,[d]b({1, 2}) = [6, 8] .
In conclusion we cannot relate F(TAL; ·, ·) with a game theoretic solution ot
the interval bankruptcy game.
The issue to provide an analog of Theorem 2.2 to this setting remains on
open question.
4The fact that this is a game theoretic rule is shown in Aumann and Maschler [1].
12
References
[1] Aumann, R.J. and Maschler M., Game theoretic analysis of a
bankruptcy problem from the Talmud, Journal of Economic Theory 36
(1985) 195–213.
[2] Branzei R., Dall’Aglio M. and Tijs S., Interval game theoretic division
rules, preprint, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, The
Netherlands, CentER DP 97 (2008)
[3] Branzei R., Dimitrov D. and Tijs S., Shapley-like values for interval
bankruptcy games, Economics Bulletin 3 (2003) 1–8.
[4] Branzei R., Ferrari G., Fragnelli V. and Tijs S., Two approaches to the
problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects, Annals of Operations
Research 109 (2002) 357-372.
[5] Curiel, I.J., M.Maschler and S.H.Tijs, Bankruptcy games, Zeitschrift fu¨r
Operations Research 31 (1987) A 143 – A 159.
[6] Moore R., Methods and applications of interval analysis, SIAM Studies
in Applied Mathematics (1995).
[7] Moulin H., Priority rules and other asymmetric rationing models, Econo-
metrica 68 (2000) 643-684.
[8] Moulin H., Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing, Chapter 6 of K. Arrow,
A. Sen and K. Suzumura (eds.), The Handbook of Social Choice and
Welfare (2002), Vol. 1, North Holland
[9] O’Neill B., A problem of right arbitration from the Talmud, Mathemat-
ical Social Sciences 2 (1982) 345–371.
[10] Pulido M., Borm P., Henndrickx R., Llorca N. and Sa`nchez-Soriano J.,
Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references, Annals
of Operations Research 158 (2008) 133-141.
[11] Pulido M., Sa`nchez-Soriano J. and Llorca N., Game theoretic techniques
for university management: an extended bankruptcy model, Annals of
Operations Research 109 (2002) 129-142.
13
[12] Thomson W., Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy
problems: a survey, Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 249–297.
[13] Tijs S. and Branzei R., Cost sharing in joint projects. In: Carraro,
C. and Fragnelli, V. (Eds.), Game Practice and Environment. Edward
Edgar Publishing (2004) pp. 113-124.
14
